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supply chain with e-commerce platform
Jili Pan1, Xinjian Zhou1,2,Wenjing You1
1
College of Management, Wuhan Textile University, Wuhan,430200, China
2
Research center of enterprise decision supportion, Hubei Province Research base for Humanities
and social sciences Wuhan,430073,China
Abstract: The homogenization of products has caused e-commerce platform merchants to provide differentiated services to
consumers through value-added services, in order to enhance the competitiveness of the market. Introduce the value-added
service level factor in the e-commerce environment, consider the impact of e-commerce platform merchants providing
value-added services on supply chain pricing, construct a secondary supply chain for manufacturers and e-commerce
platform merchants, and compare and analyze centralized decision-making supply chains and dispersion decision-making
supply chain pricing decisions. The simulation analysis shows that the increase of the value-added service level coefficient in
a certain range has a positive stimulation effect on the product pricing of the e-commerce platform. Centralized
decision-making supply chain and decentralized decision-making supply chain have a critical value for product pricing, and
centralized decision-making supply chain is more sensitive to value-added services.The impact of the value-added service
level on the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain is less than the overall profit of the decentralized
decision-making supply chain.

Keywords: Pricing decisions, Value-added services, Centralized decision making, Decentralized decision making

1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasingly fierce market competition and the shortened product life cycle

[1]

, the sales model of

enterprises has undergone major changes, and more and more enterprises tend to sell products through
e-commerce platforms. Merchants of the e-commerce platform realized that in addition to the quality and price
of the product itself, by providing differentiated value-added services, the utility of the consumer can be
improved, thereby winning greater profits [2]. The homogenization of various similar products is becoming more
and more serious. Merchants increase market competitiveness through value-added services. More and more
enterprises mean the importance of value-added services. For example, Jingdong Mall announced the launch of
the “211” time-limited service in 2010. In the same year, Jingdong’s sales exceeded 10 billion, an increase of
150% from 2009.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many businesses are aware of the importance of value-added services, but they don't know much about
how value-added services affect consumers' choices and incentives. A large number of scholars study its impact
on product pricing from the perspective of consumer behavior, sales channels, product performance. Cohen and
Whang [3] constructed a product lifecycle model that examined the competition decision-making issues between
manufacturers and independent service providers regarding after-sales service quality and price; Based on
strategic consumer behavior between Nairp [4] and Levin [5], The dynamic pricing problem of retailers' products
is studied from the perspectives of monopoly and competition. Du et al. [6]considering the strategic consumer risk
1
2
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appetite and decreasing willingness to pay, studied and analyzed the price compensation strategy that can
alleviate the consumer behavior of the strategy and the applicable conditions of this strategy. Liu et al.
Prasad et al.

[8]

[7]

and

studied the dynamic pricing of differentiated products in the presence of strategic consumers. The

former studies the multi-stage dynamic price competition of strategic consumers from the perspective of product
vertical differentiation. The latter assumes that both strategic consumers and short-sighted consumers exist
simultaneously. Based on two-stage dynamic pricing, two different pricing methods are studied. Manufacturers
opening network direct sales channels will inevitably affect the profits of related retailers, resulting in channel
conflicts and affecting retailers' order enthusiasm. Zhao Lianxia and Cheng Mingbao studied the pricing strategy
of manufacturers not opening up direct marketing and open network direct sales channels when making profit
sharing[9]. Liu Xinmin

[10]

and others proceeded from consumer satisfaction, considering consumers'

heterogeneous preferences for green products, and constructing a three-way dynamic game model involving
manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Analyze the impact of consumer sensitivity on price and greenness on
consumer satisfaction and vendor pricing decisions.
At present, most scholars are priced to influence the pricing decisions of products, and it is easy to ignore
the influence of intangible factors on product pricing decisions. This paper introduces the value-added service
level factor in the e-commerce environment, and considers the impact of e-commerce platform merchants
providing value-added services on supply chain pricing. In summary, in the e-commerce environment, this paper
constructs a secondary supply chain consisting of manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchants, and
builds a demand function for the value-added service level of e-commerce platform merchants. Contrasting and
analyzing the strategies of optimal pricing and value-added service levels of each entity under centralized
decision-making and decentralized decision-making.
3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND PARAMETER ASSUMPTION
Two-stage supply chain based on a manufacturer( M ) and an e-commerce platform merchant( R ).
Typically, manufacturers provide goods to e-commerce platform merchants, while e-commerce platform
merchants provide consumers goods with value-added services through e-commerce platforms. Merchants
stimulate market demand by providing value-added services, which brings the cost of value-added

1
services C  S    s 2 [11].The product demand function [12,13,14] with value-added services can be represented by
2
Q  D   P   s , and the product demand function without value-added services can be represented by
Q  D   P . Since the product pricing issue is considered in the text, there is no shortage of goods. Assuming
information is Shared in the supply chain, e-commerce platform merchants and manufacturers are ideal
individuals whose risk appetite is neutral

[15]

.Because each individual in the supply chain is for profit, the unit

cost per manufacturer for producing a commodity is c , and the e-commerce platform purchases the product at
the wholesale price  and then sells it to the consumer at the price p . So there is p    c . The relevant
parameter symbols are shown in Table 1.
Table 1.
symbol

meaning

D

Basic consumer demand for products on
e-commerce platforms



Consumer sensitivity to price

Parameter description
symbol

s1

s2

meaning
Product value-added service level under centralized
decision supply chain
Product value-added service level under
decentralized decision-making supply chain
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Consumer sensitivity to value-added services



E-commerce platform to increase the cost
coefficient of value-added services
Product pricing under a centralized

p11

decision-making supply chain with
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 11

The overall profit of the supply chain under the

 12

The overall profit of a centralized decision-making

 21

The overall profit of a decentralized decision-making

 22

The overall profit of a decentralized decision-making

centralized decision of value-added services

supply chain without value-added services

supply chain with value-added services

value-added services

p12
p21
p22

1

Centralized decision-making supply chain
product pricing without value-added services
Decentralized decision-making supply chain

supply chain without value-added services

 2M

product pricing with value-added services
There is no value-added service decentralized

 2M

decision-making supply chain product pricing
Wholesale price of products under centralized

Profits of decentralized decision-making supply chain
1

manufacturers with value-added services
Decentralized decision-making supply chain

2

manufacturer's profit without value-added services
Profits of e-commerce platforms in providing

 2R

1

decision supply chain

value-added services under decentralized
decision-making

2

Wholesale price of products under

Profits of e-commerce platforms without value-added

 2R

2

decentralized decision supply chain

services under decentralized decision-making

4. CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SUPPLY CHAIN E-COMMERCE PLATFORM
MERCHANT PRICING STRATEGY
In the centralized decision-making supply chain, manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchant are
seen as a whole, and strive to maximize the profit of the supply chain. At this time, the biggest profit of the
supply chain is to seek the maximum profit of the supply chain as a whole [16].
4.1 Centralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy with value-added services
When e-commerce platform merchants provide value-added services, the overall profit function of the
1
2

supply chain is 11 =  p11  c  Q  c  s1    p11  c  D   P11   s1    s12 .
According to the backstepping method,the optimal pricing of the e-commerce platform merchants in the
centralized decision-making supply chain is p11 
s1 

 D  c    2 
2   2

, and the optimal value-added service level is

  D c
.
2   2

Substituting p11


 D  c    2 
2  

2

and s1 

  D c
into  11 yields the optimal profit under the
2   2

centralized decision-making supply chain:

1 =

  D c

2

2  2   2 

（1）

4.2 Centralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy without value-added services
When the e-commerce platform merchant does not provide value-added services, the overall profit function
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of the supply chain is 12 =  p12  c  Q   p12  c  D   P12  .
According to the backstepping method,The optimal pricing of products for e-commerce platform merchants


in a centralized decision-making supply chain without value-added services is p12

At this point, bring p12 

c  D
2

 c +D
.
2

into  12 , and get the optimal profit of the electronic platform merchant

when there is no value-added service.

 =

12

 D c

2

（2）

4

5. DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SUPPLY CHAIN E-COMMERCE PLATFORM
MERCHANT PRICING STRATEGY
In the decentralized decision-making supply chain, manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchants are
independent individuals, with the goal of maximizing their respective interests. In this case, manufacturers sell
products to e-commerce platforms at wholesale prices 2 based on production costs, expected market demand
and expected returns. At this point, e-commerce platform merchants conduct price analysis based on expected
revenue and market demand and value-added service cost to determine whether the price is reasonable. If
accepted, the agreement is reached; otherwise, the manufacturer re-quotes until the parties reach an agreement.
5.1 Decentralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy with value-added services
When an e-commerce platform merchant provides value-added services, the profit function of the
e-commerce platform merchant is:

1
2

 2 R =  p21  2  Q  c  s2    p21  2  D   P21   s2    s2 2
1

（4）

According to the backstepping method, in decentralized decision-making supply chain, when the wholesale

price is 2 , the optimal pricing for the product is p21


level is s2 

 D  2    2 
2   2

, and the optimal value-added service

  D  2 
.
2   2

  D  2 
.
2  2   2 
2

From this we can get  2 R1 =

According to the agreement reached between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform merchants
under the decentralized decision-making supply chain, the profit function of the manufacturer can be obtained
when the e-commerce platform merchant provides value-added services:

 2 M = 2  c  Q  2  c  D   P21   s2 
1



（5）



Substituting p21 and s2 into equation (4) gives the manufacturer the maximum profit:

 2M =
1

 2 -c  D  2 
2   2

The optimal profit of the supply chain under decentralized decision is:

（6）
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 21 = 2 R   2 M 
1

1

  D  2 
2  2  

2

2
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2   c  D  2   D  2  D  2  22 c 

2   2
2  2   2 

(7)

5.2 Decentralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy without value-added services
When the e-commerce platform merchant does not provide value-added services, the profit function of the
e-commerce platform merchant is:  2 R2 =  p22  2  Q   p22  2  D   P22 
According to the backstepping method, In decentralized decision-making supply chain, e-commerce
platform merchants do not provide value-added services. When the wholesale price is


of the e-commerce platform merchant for the product is p22

From this we can get  2R 
2

 D  2 

2 , the optimal pricing

D  2
.
2

2

.
4
According to the agreement reached between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform merchants
under the decentralized decision-making supply chain, the profit function of the manufacturer when the
e-commerce platform merchant does not provide value-added services is:

 2 M  2  c  Q  2  c  D   p22 

(8)

2


Substituting p22
into  2R2 gives the manufacturer the maximum profit:

 2M =

2 -c  D  2 
（9）

2

2

The optimal profit of the supply chain under decentralized decision-making is:
 22   2 R   2 M 
2

 D  2  D  2  2 c 

2

（10）

4

6. CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING AND DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SUPPLY
CHAIN SIMULATION ANALYSIS
Assume that the basic market demand D  200 of a certain commodity of an e-commerce platform, the
sensitivity coefficient of the sales price and the value-added service level are   10,   5 , The value-added
service cost coefficient of e-commerce platform merchants is   10 . The manufacturer's unit cost of the
product c  5 , the wholesale price 1 =8 , 2 =9 . This is the case 2 - 2 =175 f 0 , and Table 2 can be derived
from this.
Table 2.

Centralized decision-making supply chain and decentralized decisionmaking supply chain numerical calculation results
mode

p

s

Q



Value-added service centralized decision-making supply chain

13.6

4.3

85.5

642.9

Value-added service decentralized decision-making supply chain

15.2

3.1

63.5

628.6

no value-added service centralized decision-making supply chain

12.5

——

75

562.5

no value-added service decentralized decision-making supply chain

14.5

——

55

522.5
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6.1 Analysis on the influence of value-added service level coefficient 
There is a critical value  =  between the centralized decision-making supply chain and the
decentralized decision-making supply chain for the pricing of e-commerce platform merchants. When  p

 ,

the optimal pricing of the e-commerce platform merchants in the decentralized decision-making supply chain is
higher than the centralized decision-making supply chain; when  f

 , the e-commerce platform in the

centralized decision-making supply chain is optimally priced for the product is higher than the decentralized
decision-making supply chain, as shown in Figure 1. The increase of the value-added service level coefficient
has a certain positive stimulation effect on the value-added service level of e-commerce platform products, and
the centralized decision-making supply chain is more sensitive to the increase of the value-added service level
coefficient, as shown in Figure 2.
70

55
centralized
decentralized

centralized
decentralized

60

45

value-added service level

E-commerce platform pricing of products

50

40
35
30
25

50

40

30

20

20
10

15
10

0

0

2

Figure 1.

4

6
8
The value of β

10

12

14

The impact of  on the pricing of
e-commerce platforms

0

Figure 2.

2

4

6
8
The value of β

10

12

14

The impact of  on the value of valueadded services

6.2 Influence of  on the overall profit of supply chain
When  p 2  , with the increase of the value-added service level coefficient, the overall profit of the
supply chain is also increasing. This shows that when the consumer's shopping demand is significantly affected
by the value-added service level of the e-commerce platform products, improving the value-added service level
can improve the overall profit of supply chain, but the increase in value-added service levels means that
products that require e-commerce platforms will bring greater value-added service costs, which will lead to a
decline in the profit of the supply chain, and even a state of loss, as shown in Figure 3.For the decentralized
supply chain overall profit level difference, within a certain interval, as the value of  increases, the
difference gradually increases, but when  f 2  , the overall profit level of the supply chain will have a
negative value. For the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain, the presence or absence
of value-added services is not much different from the overall profit of the supply chain, as shown in Figure 4.
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2

1.5

1

0.5

0
-100

0

5
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The value of β
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30

-0.5

Figure 3． The impact of  on the overall profit
of the supply chain

0

5

10

15
The value of β

20

25
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Figure 4. Effect of the presence or absence of  on
the overall profit margin of the supply chain

7.SUMMARY
Providing value-added services to products is an important means for enterprises to achieve differentiated
competition. In the increasingly fierce market competition, differentiated value-added services play an
increasingly important role in the product sales process. By studying the pricing strategies of centralized
decision-making supply chain and decentralized decision-making supply chain, the relevant conclusions are as
follows:(1) There is a critical value for the centralized decision-making supply chain and the decentralized
decision-making supply chain optimal pricing decision. When  p
decision-making supply chain pricing strategy is better; when  f

 , At this time, the centralized

 , At this time, the decentralized

decision-making supply chain pricing strategy is better.(2)The existence of value-added service level, the overall
pricing difference of the centralized decision-making supply chain influence is less than the overall pricing
difference of the decentralized decision-making supply chain.(3) When  p 2  , the overall profit of the
centralized decision-making supply chain and the decentralized decision-making supply chain is on the rise.
When  f 2  , the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain and the decentralized
decision-making supply chain will plummet. There are even cases of negative values. In the establishment of the
consumer demand function, this paper assumes that there is a clear linear relationship between demand and price
and value-added service level. However, in real life, there are many uncertainties, so in the next research, we
will consider supplying in an uncertain environment chain synergy.
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